AI-320 Scenario Builder

Structured scenario input instead of free text: ECAM alerts are picked from the list that applies to this aircraft (MSN), a photo only proposes alerts that the crew confirms, and every variable that changes the answer has its own field.

training use

COF app — operational checklists and AI Scenario Query →

Aircraft 1

Type a registration and choose it from the list

MEL/CDL items (Dispatch Phase) 2

The MEL / CDL page of the OFP: its item numbers are read on this device (photo or PDF, not sent, not kept) and checked against the MEL / CDL list.

Airports and Fuel 3

Fills registration, airports, ETD / ETA, weights and fuel from the THY Operational Flight Plan. The PDF is read in this browser only (not sent, not kept); crew names and numbers are not read.

Weather of each airport

Filled automatically for every airport entered above (D-ATIS and METAR); paste or change the text and the decisions follow it.

Enter an airport above.

Create your Abnormal and Emergency Scenarios with your words OR Search for Procedures and Detailed System Explanation Queries 4

Write a scenario as you would tell it: “Fill the form” reads it into the fields of the form (registration above, alerts in order, bleed values, phase, airports, ETA, weights); check them, then “Build the report”. Or write a question about a procedure, a rule or how a system works and press “Search the documents”: the search is code (no model), it finds the text in OM-A, OM-B, GOM, SHT-OPS, EASA, ICAO, FCOM, FCTM, AFM with its reference, also offline. The model explains only when you press its button.

ECAM alerts and QRH events 5

In the order they appeared. Type part of the title (for example HYD B, BLEED, SMOKE). ECAM advisories (QRH ECAM ADVISORY CONDITIONS): type ADV or the parameter (CAB ALT, OIL TEMP).

Cabin and other events 6

Events without an ECAM alert. Each one tells COF which procedure or manual to use.

Offline documents: download every document page (FCOM, QRH, FCTM, MEL, AFM, OM, GOM, …) for use without a connection; page viewer

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Alert list, LAND ASAP marks and INOP SYS items are taken from FCOM PRO-ABN for the MSN of the registration above; the OEB from the QRH OEB list for that registration; MEL items from the MEL. The photo reader is simulated here. Remaining systems are worked out by COF's system map, not shown in this prototype.

Report

The report appears here after “Build the report”, in the order of the operation: A · Ground (MEL/CDL, departure weather, de-icing / anti-icing, take-off minima) → B · Failure in flight (analysis, ECAM sequence, procedure order, limitations) → C · Approach and landing performance → D · Decision (FOR-DEC, return / continue / diversion) → Check. Each phase that does not apply shows one line saying so.
Examples (hand-written, not your scenario): TC-LSB report · LSZH flight

Example report (TC-LSB, LTFM, hand-checked). Build your own scenario above with “Build the report”.

CODE computed now in this page's build from the real FCOM / QRH / MEL data for TC-LSB (procedure text verbatim, landing distance by COF's own QRH PER-A engine) MODEL illustrative: the kind of text the model writes here. Not generated, not verified. In the product every MODEL line is checked against the CODE lines before it is shown

Scenario understanding

Facts first (CODE), then each failure explained the way it is taught: how the system works (FCOM DSC), what the failure removes, what is left, and what that means for this flight (MODEL teaching text). Every fact in the text carries its Ident; a sentence without an Ident is a conclusion and is marked (conclusion).

Facts CODE

AircraftTC-LSB · MSN 08257 · A321-271NX
PhaseCLIMB, FL150, 45 NM NW LTFM, 1512Z · IMC · day · icing possible · terrain MORA 3 100 ft
Failures, in order1. 1505Z HYD B+Y SYS LO PR LAND ASAP (climb)
2. 1508Z AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT, no subtitle shown (climb) · ENG 1 bleed 45 PSI, ENG 2 30 PSI
3. Cabin: smoke from a passenger lithium power bank, row 23, fire extinguished, device in water
MEL21-31-01A Automatic Cabin Pressure Control System
Crew / ATCMAYDAY declared · 214 pax · no DG on NOTOC
WeightLanding weight 81.0 t > MLW 79 200 kg → overweight by 1.8 t FCOM LIM-AG-WGHT-00001893.0890001 (MSN 08257)

1 · HYD B+Y SYS LO PR MODEL

How the system works. Three continuously operating systems, green, blue and yellow, each with its own reservoir; fluid cannot be transferred from one system to another DSC-29-10-10-00001133.0001001. Green: one pump driven by engine 1 DSC-29-10-20-00001134.0001001. Blue: an electric pump; in an emergency a pump driven by the RAT DSC-29-10-20-00001135.0001001. Yellow: a pump driven by engine 2, an electric pump, and a hand pump for the cargo doors DSC-29-10-20-00001136.0001001. The PTU transfers power, not fluid, between green and yellow DSC-29-10-20-00001137.0001001.

What the alert means. Blue and yellow pressure ≤ 1 450 PSI PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018917.0001001. Only green is left. Every user that has blue or yellow as its only source is lost; a user with green as well is kept DSC-29-10-30-00001148.0003001 distribution.

FunctionHydraulic sourcesNowEffect for this flight
ElevatorsL: G + B · R: Y + BL ELEV onlyPitch control stays in normal law: “Flight controls remain in normal law” PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001
Stabilizer (THS)G + Y motorsAvailablePitch trim kept
AileronsG + B eachAvailableRoll by ailerons and spoilers 5
Spoilers1 G · 2 Y · 3 B · 4 Y · 5 G1 and 5 (2 per wing)SPLR 2+3+4 lost → speed brakes lost (2-4 are the speed brake panels), fewer ground spoilers
Rudder · yaw damperG + B + Y · YD1 G, YD2 YRudder · YD1 onlyRudder kept; YAW DAMPER 2 INOP
Slats · flapsSlats G + B · flaps G + YBoth on one systemSLATS/FLAPS SLOW — both, not only one
Landing gearGG (gravity required)STATUS: “If L/G is not downlocked: L/G GRVTY PROC APPLY — Landing gear is extended by gravity to preserve green system integrity.” Gear is up (climb) → gravity extension. Go-around: L/G retraction INOP FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019296.0002001
BrakesNORM G · ALTN / PARK Y or accumulatorNORM BRK only, anti-skid availableALTN BRK INOP; parking brake may be inoperative (yellow accumulator low pressure)
Nosewheel steeringYLostNo taxi after landing
ReversersREV 1 G · REV 2 YREV 1 onlyOne reverser in the landing distance
EMER GENB (RAT)ConditionalINOP only if HYD B RSVR LO LVL: the RAT needs blue fluid DSC-29-10-20-00001138.0001001 · INOP SYS (2)
Cargo doorY (hand pump)ConditionalINOP only if HYD Y RSVR LO LVL INOP SYS (1)

Sources of the table: FCOM DSC-29-10-30-00001148.0003001 (distribution, all 37 users), DSC-27-10-20 (flight control jacks), DSC-32-30-10-00001316.0003001 (brakes), DSC-32-20-10-00018619.0007001 (N/W STRG). Cross-checked with FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019296.0002001 REMAINING SYSTEMS, column HYD B+Y SYS LO PR: NORM LAW, YD1 only, stabilizer available, 2 SPLRS/wing, L ELEV only, ailerons available, SLATS/FLAPS slow, gravity extension, NORM BRK only, anti-skid available, N/W STRG inop, REV 1 only.

Why LAND ASAP and MAYDAY. “A double hydraulic failure is an emergency situation, with red LAND ASAP displayed, and a MAYDAY should be declared to ATC. A landing must be carried out as soon as possible bearing in mind, however, that the ECAM actions should be completed prior the approach.” AP is lost; FD and A/THR remain; the PF maneuvers with care to avoid high hydraulic demand on the remaining system FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019295.0001001. After the ECAM, the QRH summary is used FCTM AOP-30-60-00018295.0001001.

2 · AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT MODEL

How the system works. Two similar engine bleed systems, each controlled and monitored by a BMC DSC-36-10-20-00001469.0001001. The bleed valve regulates pressure: with a single bleed, delivered pressure is kept at 50 ± 3 PSI DSC-36-10-20-00001472.0003001; a precooler keeps the temperature at about 200 °C DSC-36-10-20-00001473.0002001. ENG 1 bleed feeds the left side of the crossbleed duct: WING ANTI ICE (left), PACK 1, cargo heating, FTIS and hydraulic reservoir pressurization; ENG 2 feeds the right side: PACK 2, WING ANTI ICE (right). The X BLEED valve joins the two sides DSC-36-10-20-00001470.0006001.

What the alert means. It triggers with the engine running when bleed temperature sensors are lost, or the pressure is above 57 PSI (+3/−0), or the temperature is above 257 °C for 55 s, 270 °C for 15 s or 290 °C for 5 s PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00017369.0002001. ENG 1 shows 45 PSI, below the overpressure threshold, so the cause is a temperature or sensor fault, not overpressure (conclusion). The ECAM closes ENG 1 bleed, sets AFT CRG HOT AIR and PACK 1 off and opens X BLEED, so ENG 2 now feeds both sides of the duct PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00017605.0011001. The FCOM does not state why PACK 1 is set off; the report does not invent a reason.

Link to the hydraulic failure. The hydraulic reservoirs are normally pressurized by HP bleed air from engine 1; if that pressure is too low, from the crossbleed duct; this keeps the pumps from cavitating DSC-29-10-20-00001146.0001001. With ENG 1 bleed off, the reservoir of green, the only system left, is pressurized from the duct fed by ENG 2 (conclusion).

On the ECAM: E/WD and BLEED page CODE symbols and colours: FCOM DSC-36-20-00001482.0004001 · DSC-21-10-50-00000316.0006001 · E/WD: DSC-31-15-00001207.0004001

Values default to your SD photo (40 PSI, 300 °C; engine values and FOB as on the photo). Change them to see the pages and the OEB branch change.

OEB62 first. RED OEB, ECAM ENTRY AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT, applicable to TC-LSB QRH OEBPROC-62-00028472.0003001, 62.01A. With 45 PSI the OEB branch “below 250 °C, valve open amber AND above 60 PSI” is not met → ECAM PROC APPLY. Wing anti-ice remains (WING A. ICE is INOP only with the BLEED NOT CLOSED subtitle) PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00011092.0002001 · PRO-ABN-AIR-T-00015887.0028001.

3 · Cabin smoke, lithium power bank MODEL

Smoke in the cabin → [QRH] SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE, CABIN EQPT branch PRO-ABN-SMOKE-D-00012214.0007001 · QRH 27.01D–E; cabin crew: the CCM lithium battery fire procedure (CCM section to be confirmed). Fire extinguished, device in water: the procedure continues to “If smoke/fumes disappear within 5 min: NORMAL VENTILATION RESTORE” PRO-ABN-SMOKE-D-00012215.0001001.

4 · Overweight landing MODEL

81.0 t > MLW 79 200 kg; “In exceptional cases (in flight turn back or diversion), an immediate landing at weight above maximum landing weight is permitted, provided the pilot follows the overweight landing procedure” LIM-AG-WGHT-00001893.0890001. [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING PRO-ABN-MISC-00023093.0001001 · QRH 25.07A (ABN-25-00010864.0110001): “FLAP LVR FULL FOR LANDING UNLESS SPECIFIED BY ABN PROC” — here the HYD procedure specifies FLAP LVR 3; “If landing CONF other than FULL: USE CONF 1+F FOR GO AROUND”; “USE MAX REVERSE ASAP” — REV 1 only.

Conflicts between the procedures CODE detected · resolution open

#Procedure AProcedure BStatus
1HYD B+Y STATUS: APPR SPD VREF + 25 KT PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001OVERWEIGHT LANDING: SPEED AT RUNWAY THRESHOLD: VLS — “Reduce the speed to reach VLS at the runway threshold” PRO-ABN-MISC-00023093.0001001Open. To be resolved from AFM / FCTM; not decided by the model
2OVERWEIGHT LANDING, for approach: PACK 1 and PACK 2 OFF OR SUPPLIED BY APU (go-around thrust)Cabin smoke event: ventilation; PACK 1 already OFF (bleed fault)Open. Crew decision with the smoke state at that time
3OVERWEIGHT LANDING: FLAP LVR FULLHYD B+Y: FOR LDG FLAP LVR 3Resolved by the procedure's own text: “UNLESS SPECIFIED BY ABN PROC” → CONF 3

Aircraft status (MEL) CODE

MEL item21-31-01A Automatic CPC 1 inoperative MEL MI-21-31-00007492.0002001 · MI-21-31 P 1/6 (TC-LSB)
System21-31-01 Automatic Cabin Pressure Control System (CPC, Outflow Valve AUTO Channel)
Repair interval · installed · required · placardC · 2 · 1 · No
Dispatch conditions (o)Automatic cabin pressure control system 1 may be inoperative provided that:
1) It is deactivated, and
2) The cabin pressure indications on the CAB PRESS SD page are checked operative in manual mode, and
3) The LDG ELEV selector MAN function is operative, and
4) The AOT reference A53N020-25 is not applicable or Airbus approved instructions are successfully accomplished to recover panels conformity.
Operational procedure (o)MEL MO-21-31-00008875.0002001 · MO-21-31 P 1/2
DURING COCKPIT PREPARATION — If CPC 1 is affected: AIR COND/CAB/PRESS/CTL 1 (49VU D09) C/B....Pull · RPCU (122VU X23) C/B....Pull · MODE SEL pb-sw....MAN · on the CAB PRESS SD page, check that the cabin differential pressure, the cabin vertical speed, the cabin altitude, and the outflow valve position are available · MAN V/S CTL sw....DN · check outflow valve movement · RPCU C/B....Push · MODE SEL pb-sw....AUTO
Compound effect MODELPressurization is on CPC 2 alone (2 installed, 1 required). A failure of CPC 2 now would leave only manual control (CAB PR SYS 1+2 FAULT → MEL 21-31-01C logic) (conclusion). With a cabin smoke event and one pack, the cabin altitude is watched: OEB62 states “AT ANY TIME of the procedure, if CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT alert triggers, IMMEDIATELY APPLY: CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT ECAM PROC”. No landing-distance factor from this item.

System analysis

What is lost CODE

SystemStateFrom
HydraulicBLUE and YELLOW lost · GREEN (ENG 1 pump) remainsPRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018917.0001001 · DSC-29-10-20-00001134.0001001
Flight controlsNormal law kept (“Flight controls remain in normal law”) · R ELEV, SPLR 2+3+4, SPD BRK, YAW DAMPER 2 INOPPRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001 · INOP SYS
Auto flight / approachAP 1+2 INOP · CAT 2 INOP · GLS AUTOLAND INOP → manual flying, CAT 1PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 INOP SYS
Ground decelerationREVERSER 2 INOP · ALTN BRK INOP · N/W STRG INOP · SPD BRK DO NOT USEPRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 INOP SYS · STATUS
Bleed / air conditioningENG 1 BLEED and PACK 1 INOP · X BLEED OPEN · one pack (PACK 2)PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00011092.0002001
Wing anti-iceNot in INOP SYS (WING A. ICE and APU BLEED are INOP only with the BLEED NOT CLOSED subtitle)PRO-ABN-AIR-T-00015887.0028001
Landing gearGravity extension; no retraction for go-aroundPRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 · PRO-ABN-LG-00011286.0011001 · FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019296.0002001
ConditionalEMER GEN INOP only if HYD B RSVR LO LVL (2) · CARGO DOOR INOP only if HYD Y RSVR LO LVL (1)PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 INOP SYS (1)(2)
FuelFUEL CONSUMPT INCRSD · FMS PRED UNRELIABLE → QRH fuel penalty factorPRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 STATUS (3)(4) · QRH OPS-00014206.0001001

Interactions between the failures MODEL

  • Cabin smoke + HYD B+Y: the smoke procedure can lead to ELEC EMER CONFIG … CONSIDER, which needs the EMER GEN (RAT). If the blue loss was by B RSVR LO LVL, EMER GEN is INOP: ELEC EMER CONFIG would not be available. Ask the crew which HYD B alert came first.
  • Cabin smoke + one pack (PACK 1 off) + MEL 21-31-01A: less ventilation capacity for smoke removal; the smoke procedure's own note says a single pack may not hold cabin pressure with BLOWER and EXTRACT in OVRD.
  • Icing possible: wing anti-ice is still available (no subtitle). If BLEED NOT CLOSED appears later, the status changes to AVOID ICING CONDITIONS.
  • ENG 1 bleed off + green the only hydraulic system: green reservoir pressurization now comes from the crossbleed duct, fed by ENG 2 (DSC-29-10-20-00001146.0001001).
  • Overweight landing + smoke: PACKS OFF OR SUPPLIED BY APU for approach versus ventilation (conflict 2 above).

OEB · ECAM · QRH, in order of application CODE

Memory items

None for these alerts.

OEB62 (RED) for AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT QRH OEBPROC-62-00028472.0003001 · 62.01A/B

AT ANY TIME of the procedure, if CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT alert triggers, IMMEDIATELY APPLY: CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT ECAM PROC If AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT: BLEED SD page....CHECK If affected engine bleed air temperature below 250 °C: If affected engine bleed valve indicated open (in line) in amber AND associated engine bleed air pressure above 60 PSI: → OEB actions In all other cases: ECAM PROC....APPLY If affected engine bleed air temperature above 250 °C: ECAM PROC....APPLY

Evaluation with the input: ENG 1 (affected) bleed pressure 45 PSI → not above 60 PSI → “In all other cases: ECAM PROC APPLY”, whatever the valve position. Bleed temperature still to be read on the BLEED SD page: above 250 °C also gives ECAM PROC, so the result does not change here.

ECAM HYD B+Y SYS LO PR FCOM PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001

HYD B+Y SYS LO PR LAND ASAP If yellow sys lost by ENG 2 PUMP LO PR: YELLOW ELEC PUMP..............ON If blue sys lost by ELEC PUMP LO PR: RAT...........................MAN ON MIN RAT SPD...................140 KT AFFECTED PUMPS................OFF MAX SPEED.....................320/0.77 MANEUVER WITH CARE FOR GO-AROUND MAX PITCH 15 DEG THR LVR.......................TOGA THEN MCT FUEL CONSUMPT INCRSD FMS PRED UNRELIABLE

ECAM AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT FCOM PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00017605.0011001

AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT ENG BLEED (AFFECTED)..........OFF AFT CRG HOT AIR...............OFF (installed on MSN 08257) PACK (AFFECTED)...............OFF X BLEED.......................OPEN

[QRH] SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE, cabin equipment branch FCOM PRO-ABN-SMOKE-D-00012214.0007001

If CABIN EQPT smoke/fumes suspected: If smoke/fumes continue: EMER EXIT LIGHT...............ON COMMERCIAL....................OFF SMOKE / FUMES DISSIPATION.....CHECK FAULTY EQPT...................SEARCH / ISOLATE If smoke/fumes persist or if faulty equipment confirmed isolated: COMMERCIAL....................NORM REMOVAL OF SMOKE / FUMES......CONSIDER If smoke/fumes disappear within 5 min: NORMAL VENTILATION............RESTORE PRO-ABN-SMOKE-D-00012215.0001001

Cabin crew side: the lithium battery fire procedure of the CCM. (section reference to be confirmed)

STATUS, HYD B+Y SYS LO PR FCOM PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001

MIN RAT SPD...................140 KT (if the RAT is out) MAX SPEED.....................320/0.77 MANEUVER WITH CARE SPD BRK.......................DO NOT USE APPR PROC DUAL HYD LO PR IF HYD NOT RECOVERED: FOR LDG.......................FLAP LVR 3 GPWS LDG FLAP 3...............ON If L/G is not downlocked: L/G GRVTY PROC................APPLY APPR SPD......................VREF + 25 KT LDG DIST PROC.................APPLY Note: Following a yellow hydraulic system failure, the parking brake may be inoperative due to yellow accumulator low pressure.

Then [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING (81.0 t > MLW). Fuel: QRH fuel penalty factor method OPS-00014206.0001001.

FOR-DEC phase by phase MODEL

One short FOR-DEC per phase instead of one long block. The procedure lines in each phase come from the CODE section above; the model only orders and joins them.

1 · Now: climb, FL150 1512Z · IMC · icing possible

FB+Y lost (LAND ASAP), ENG 1 bleed off, single pack, cabin smoke source extinguished, MAYDAY declared. OLevel off and return to LTFM · continue climb to EGLL · divert LTFJ / LTBA. DLevel off, return to LTFM: LAND ASAP, smoke event, departure airport known, long runways. EPF: fly, level off, MAX SPEED 320/0.77, maneuver with care, manual flight (AP 1+2 INOP). PM: OEB62 check → ECAM HYD, ECAM BLEED, ATC (MAYDAY, intentions, souls, fuel), cabin crew report on the smoke. CSmoke dissipating within 5 min? Cabin altitude normal (OEB62: CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT at any time)?

2 · Descent and preparation ~1520Z–1540Z

FLanding weight 81.0 t, overweight 1.8 t; FMS fuel predictions unreliable; LDA at LTFM 2 819–4 100 m. OOverweight landing now · hold to burn down to MLW. DOverweight landing: LAND ASAP and a cabin smoke event outweigh 1.8 t; [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING applied. EPM: STATUS, [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING, landing distance (section Landing), fuel penalty. PF: brief CONF 3, VAPP 165 kt, manual CAT 1 approach, go-around: MAX PITCH 15 DEG, TOGA then MCT. Cabin: prepare for landing, evacuation briefing. CRunway chosen ≥ factored landing distance; MORA 3 100 ft respected in IMC.

3 · Approach gear and flaps · PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 APPR PROC

FSLATS/FLAPS SLOW (slats and flaps each on one system); gear up, gravity extension required; no gear retraction on go-around. DEarly configuration, stabilised by 1 000 ft. EPM: L/G GRVTY PROC APPLY — [QRH] L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION (PRO-ABN-LG-00011286.0011001, QRH 24.02A/B): GRAVITY GEAR EXTN handcrank PULL AND TURN, L/G lever DOWN. PF: FLAP LVR 3, PM: GPWS LDG FLAP 3 ON. APPR SPD VREF + 25 KT (see conflict 1). Go-around: MAX PITCH 15 DEG, TOGA THEN MCT, CONF 1+F. CGear down and locked, CONF 3, VAPP 165 kt, no SPD BRK.

4 · Landing and roll-out

FREVERSER 2, ALTN BRK, N/W STRG, YAW DAMPER 2 INOP; normal brakes on green. EPF: one reverser (REV 1), directional control with rudder and differential braking. No nosewheel steering: plan to stop on the runway. CBrake temperatures after an overweight landing.

5 · After stop

FParking brake may be inoperative (yellow accumulator); no taxi without nosewheel steering; smoke event earlier. ORemain on runway, tow · evacuate. DRemain on runway and tow, unless smoke / fire returns → [QRH] EMER EVAC. EChocks before releasing brakes. ATC: runway blocked. Cabin: passengers seated.

Landing performance CODE

COF's QRH in-flight method (PER-A), run on the QRH PER-I tables of TC-LSB: B + Y SYS LO PR, FLAPS 3, 81.0 t, LTFM elevation 325 ft, OAT 15 °C, calm wind, no slope, one reverser, overweight procedure applied. AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT has no landing-distance row of its own (the PER-D row is for dual bleed faults with ice accretion), so it adds nothing.

VAPP 165 kt = VREF 140 kt (81 t, between 80 t and 84 t, linear, rounded up) + ΔVREF 25 kt + APPR COR 0 kt (ΔVREF ≥ 25 kt) QRH PER-A 11/16 · PER-A-00014420.0073001 — matches STATUS “APPR SPD VREF + 25 KT”.

QRH PER-IDRY (6)GOOD (5)GOOD TO MEDIUM (4)MEDIUM (3)
REF DIST, B + Y, FLAPS 3, 78 t1 6902 5002 6603 010
WGT, 3 t above 78 t+150+180+120+120
ALT, 325 ft+23+46+33+39
TEMP, ISA +0.6 °C+4+7+6+7
REV, 1 operative−80−260−320−420
OVW, overweight procedure+580+370+470+440
Landing distance2 367 m2 843 m2 969 m3 197 m
Factored (× 1.15)2 723 m3 270 m3 415 m3 677 m

Tables: QRH PER-I 1/36 to 4/36 · PER-I-00014170.0173001. MEL 21-31-01A: no landing distance factor.

QRH page used — cells marked by the calculator

LTFM runways against the factored distance

RunwayLDAWidthDRYMEDIUM
17L / 35R · 17R / 35L4 100 m60 mOKOK
16L / 34R · 16R / 34L3 750 m45 / 60 mOKOK
09 / 272 819 m45 mOKshort

Wind and runway condition come from the LTFM D-ATIS / METAR at run time; here they are not given, so four runway conditions are shown. N/W STRG INOP: runways of 45 m or more come first (all LTFM runways).

Decision MODEL

#OptionVerdict
1Return to LTFM, overweight landing, CONF 3, VAPP 165 kt, manual CAT 1 on a 4 100 m runway✅ SELECTED
2Hold to burn down to MLW 79.2 t❌ REJECTED — LAND ASAP and a smoke event; overweight landing is permitted in a turn back with the procedure (LIM-AG-WGHT)
3Continue to EGLL❌ REJECTED — LAND ASAP
4Divert LTFJ / LTBA❌ REJECTED — no advantage over LTFM in runway length; weather not compared in this example
5Smoke returns or fire✅ CONTINGENCY — land at the nearest suitable runway, [QRH] EMER EVAC as required

Commander decision: return to LTFM and land as soon as possible with the overweight landing procedure, because LAND ASAP (HYD B+Y SYS LO PR) and the cabin smoke event, with the factored landing distance (2 723 m dry, 3 677 m medium) within the 4 100 m runways.

Execution flow CODE order · MODEL wording

Order rule: MEMORY ITEMS → OEB → ECAM → QRH → FCOM. Decision gates read the crew's own inputs.

STEP 0 · FLY · NAVIGATE · COMMUNICATE

Tasksharing in abnormal operations: PF = FLY, NAVIGATE, and COMMUNICATE once ECAM/QRH/OEB actions are initiated; PM = MONITOR and perform the ECAM/QRH/OEB actions FCTM AOP-20-00016255.0001001 · AOP-30-30-00021495.0001001

FLY — what automation is left

AP 1 + 2LostINOP SYS AP 1+2 PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001
FD · A/THRAvailable“The AP will not be available to the crew but both FD and A/THR still remain.” FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019295.0001001
Flight lawNormal“Flight controls remain in normal law” PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001

→ Manual flight with FD and A/THR kept. A/THR is not set off: it is not lost and no line of these procedures removes it (conclusion).

WhoActionCalloutSource
PFAP disconnected by the failure: cavalry charge is permanent until the MASTER WARN light or the takeover pb is pressed → takeover pb—DSC-31-10-A-00015448.0001001 · DSC-22_30-30-30-00025206.0001001
PFFly manually; FMA AP column: AP 1 gone, 1 FD 2 and A/THR remain“AP OFF” — every FMA change is called by the PF; PM: “CHECKED”PRO-NOR-SCO-00011908.0001001 · PRO-NOR-SCO-A-00011907.0001001
PF → PMWith AP OFF, the FCU selections are made by the PM upon PF request—FCTM AOP-20-00016256.0001001
PFStop the climb“PUSH TO LEVEL OFF” (or “FL 150 PULL”)PRO-NOR-SCO-A-00011905.0001001
PFSelected speed, within MAX SPEED 320/0.77“PULL SPEED ___ KNOTS”FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019295.0001001 (use of selected speeds) · PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001
PFMANEUVER WITH CARE: avoid high hydraulic demand on the green system—FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019295.0001001
PFFirst ECAM only“ECAM ACTIONS”FCTM AOP-30-30-A-00021501.0001001 · PRO-ABN-ABN-00-B-00011915.0001001

NAVIGATE — what navigation is left

  • No electrical failure: FMGC, ADIRS, GPS, MCDU, NDs, FCU and the radio navigation receivers are not in any INOP SYS list → FMS navigation remains, flown manually on the FD (conclusion from the INOP SYS lists).
  • FMS PRED UNRELIABLE: disregard FMS fuel predictions; use the QRH fuel penalty factor PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001 (4) · OPS-00014206.0001001.
  • Approach capability: CAT 2 INOP, GLS AUTOLAND INOP, AP INOP → CAT 1, manual. ILS with FD; RNP APCH also possible — its minimum equipment is one FMGC, one GPS, two IRS, one MCDU, one FD, one PFD on the PF side, two NDs, two FCU channels: all available PRO-SPO-51-G-00015840.0001001 (MSN 02823-11446).
  • Terrain: MORA 3 100 ft in IMC. Below 10 000 ft, MCDU entries only with operational effect (PERF APPR, DIR TO, NAVAIDS, runway change, SEC F-PLN, ENABLE ALTN) FCTM AOP-20-00016257.0001001.

COMMUNICATE — ATC, cabin

  • MAYDAY, not PAN PAN: distress = “threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and requiring immediate assistance” OM-A 12.1.2.12 (A); “A double hydraulic failure is an emergency situation, with red LAND ASAP displayed, and a MAYDAY should be declared to ATC.” FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019295.0001001
  • Message order (time and circumstances permitting): MAYDAY ×3 · station · callsign · aircraft type · nature of the emergency · intention · position, level, heading · other useful information (endurance, POB…) OM-A 12.1.2.12 (G). ATC needs: identification and type, type of emergency, intentions, position and level; persons on board, fuel remaining, hazardous materials ICAO Doc 4444 15.1.1.2 a), e).
PF → ATC“MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY, [ISTANBUL CONTROL], [TURKISH 1975], AIRBUS A321, DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE BLUE AND YELLOW, ENGINE ONE BLEED FAULT, SMOKE IN THE CABIN FROM A PASSENGER POWER BANK, FIRE EXTINGUISHED, REQUEST IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ISTANBUL AIRPORT FOR LANDING RUNWAY [__], 45 MILES NORTHWEST OF ISTANBUL AIRPORT, LEVELLING FLIGHT LEVEL 150, HEADING [___], 214 PASSENGERS AND [__] CREW, FUEL 13.5 TONNES, NO DANGEROUS GOODS.”

[ ] = from the flight: station in use, callsign, runway, heading, crew number. Example callsign only.

  • Squawk: already in contact with ATC → keep the assigned code until instructed; 7700 if not in contact OM-A 12.1.2.12 (D), (E) · ICAO Doc 4444 15.1.1.1 Note 2.
  • Later calls: “[TURKISH 1975] MAYDAY” as callsign suffix OM-A 12.1.2.12 (F).
  • Cabin — NITS to the cabin chief CCM 8.3: N dual hydraulic failure and engine bleed fault; cabin smoke handled · I return to Istanbul, overweight landing, aircraft stops on the runway · T about 38 min (ETA 1550Z) · S landing preparation as instructed; after landing “CABIN CREW and PASSENGERS REMAIN SEATED!” unless evacuation is ordered PRO-ABN-ABN-00-B-00020059.0001001.
—
STEP 1 · MEMORY ITEMS
none for these alerts
PM
STEP 2 · OEB62 RED · OEBPROC-62-00028472.0003001
BLEED SD page CHECK: ENG 1 temperature, valve, pressure
GATE · ENG 1 temp < 250 °C AND valve open amber AND pressure > 60 PSI ?
YES → OEB actions (ENG BLEED 1 OFF, WING ANTI ICE OFF, X BLEED OPEN, AVOID ICING, APU BLEED OFF …)
NO (45 PSI) → ECAM PROC APPLY ✓
PM reads · PF confirms
STEP 3 · ECAM · PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018727.0004001 · PRO-ABN-AIR-C-00017605.0011001
HYD B+Y SYS LO PR (LAND ASAP) → AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT
PM · cabin crew
STEP 4 · QRH 27.01D–E (in parallel) · PRO-ABN-SMOKE-D-00012214.0007001
[QRH] SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE, CABIN EQPT branch · CCM lithium battery
PF
ATC
MAYDAY · return to LTFM · souls 214 + crew · fuel
GATE · smoke disappears within 5 min ?
YES → NORMAL VENTILATION RESTORE
NO → REMOVAL OF SMOKE / FUMES CONSIDER · ELEC EMER CONFIG CONSIDER (check EMER GEN: HYD B RSVR LO LVL?)
PM
STEP 5 · STATUS · PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001
MAX SPEED 320/0.77 · SPD BRK DO NOT USE · APPR SPD VREF + 25 · LDG DIST PROC APPLY · fuel penalty
PM
STEP 6 · PERFORMANCE · QRH 25.07A · PER-I 1/36–4/36 · PER-A 11/16
[QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING · landing distance (factored 2 723–3 677 m) · VAPP 165 kt · runway
PF
STEP 7 · BRIEFING · QRH summary (FCTM AOP-30-60)
CONF 3, manual CAT 1, gravity gear, go-around MAX PITCH 15 DEG / TOGA THEN MCT / CONF 1+F, no gear retraction, stop on runway
PF · PM
STEP 8 · APPROACH · PRO-ABN-HYD-L-00018342.0026001
FLAP LVR 3 · GPWS LDG FLAP 3 ON · L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION (QRH 24.02A/B)
PF
STEP 9 · LANDING · PRO-ABN-MISC-00023093.0001001
INCREASE FLARE HEIGHT · MINIMIZE V/S AT TOUCHDOWN · USE MAX REVERSE ASAP (REV 1 only) · brakes after nosewheel touchdown · rudder, no N/W STRG · BRAKE FANS [IF INSTALLED] ON
GATE · smoke / fire after stop ?
YES → [QRH] EMER EVAC
NO → chocks, remain on runway, tow

Check before showing CODE

  • Every procedure line above exists verbatim in FCOM / QRH for MSN 08257 / TC-LSB.
  • LAND ASAP present → decision is a landing, not a continuation.
  • OEB62 evaluated before the ECAM procedure, with the crew's pressure.
  • MLW 79 200 kg exceeded → [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING and OVW correction included.
  • VAPP and landing distance taken from the CODE engine, not written by the model.
  • Open: conflict 1 (VREF + 25 KT vs VLS at threshold) and conflict 2 (PACKS OFF for approach vs smoke); bleed temperature (BLEED SD); which HYD B alert came first (EMER GEN); LTFM wind and runway condition; CCM section number.

LSZH flight (example scenario)

Training flight, TC-LSB (MSN 08257, A321-271NX), LSZH → LTFM. Winter departure in freezing fog with low visibility; after takeoff NAV ADR 1+2 FAULT, ENG 2 FAIL and AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT; return to LSZH under LVP. Every gate below is computed live from the inputs and cites its rule. Values marked scenario input are not in COF's documents (chart minima, holdover time, OFP fuel, airport facilities) and are set by the instructor or the crew.

Synthesized voice, fictitious traffic. LiveATC audio needs LiveATC's consent (terms of use).

2 · After takeoff — ECAM sequence

0624Z climbing through FL150 in cloud, TAT −12 °C: NAV ADR 1+2 FAULT; 0626Z ENG 2 FAIL; 0629Z AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT (ENG 1 bleed 300 °C). Red = level 3, amber = caution (alert title colour in the FCOM PDF); level 3 > level 2 > level 1 DSC-31-10-00001204.0001001.

Crew

Same-level (amber) alerts are shown in time order and marked order not confirmed: the FWC priority between them is not in COF's documents. SD pages are schematics: layout after FCOM DSC-29-20 (HYD), DSC-24-20 (ELEC), DSC-36-20 (BLEED); only the states stated by the procedures are drawn, values that the FCOM does not give are not drawn.

3 · Scenario understanding MODEL teaching text · facts with Ident

ADR 1 + 2

Each ADIRU has an ADR part (barometric altitude, airspeed, Mach, angle of attack, temperature, overspeed warnings) and an IR part; either part can work separately DSC-34-NAV-10-10-00018524.0001001. ADIRU 1 supplies PFD 1 and ND 1, ADIRU 2 supplies PFD 2 and ND 2; ADIRU 3 can replace ADR 1 with the AIR DATA selector at CAPT 3 DSC-34-NAV-10-20-00018529.0001001 — the procedure sets AIR DATA SWTG CAPT 3. ADR data also go to the ELACs, SFCCs, FADECs, GPWS, FWC and BSCU DSC-34-NAV-10-10-00018527.0001001. With two ADRs lost: normal law lost, alternate law with protections lost except maneuver protection; direct law when the gear is down; AP 1+2, A/THR, CAT 2 and GPWS (ADR 1 failed) INOP; the SFCCs set CONF 1+F instead of CONF 1 PRO-ABN-NAV-B-00017147.0006001 · PRO-ABN-NAV-B-00017397.0014001. So the F/O side has no air data (conclusion): the captain, with ADR 3, flies.

ENG 2 failure and what engine 2 drove

Each engine drives its generator, its hydraulic pump (ENG 1 green, ENG 2 yellow), its bleed and its own engine anti-ice DSC-24-10-20-00017751.0001001 · DSC-29-10-20-00001134/1136 · DSC-36 · DSC-30. The ENG 2 SHUT DOWN procedure lists them as secondary failures *HYD, *ELEC, *AIR BLEED and INOP SYS GEN 2, Y ENG 2 PUMP, ENG 2 BLEED, PACK 2, MAIN GALLEY PRO-ABN-ENG-I-00017837.0012001 · PRO-ABN-ENG-I-00017852.0020001.

  • Electrical: one generator can supply all bus bars; with one GEN inoperative, the remaining GEN supplies AC 1 and AC 2 DSC-24-10-10-00017750.0001001 · DSC-24-10-30-40-00017765.0002001. MAIN GALLEY INOP.
  • Hydraulic: the PTU transfers power between green and yellow when the differential pressure is above 500 PSI DSC-29-10-20-00001137.0001001; it “allows to cover the loss of one engine or one engine driven pump” FCTM PR-AEP-HYD-00019294.0001001.
  • Bleed: only engine 1 bleed is left until the bleed fault.

Electrical: animated step by step on the FCOM page in the System analysis of a built report (ENG 2 SHUT DOWN — secondary failure *ELEC), with its summary.

ENG 1 bleed fault with engine 2 shut down — the key interaction

OEB62: ENG 1 at 300 °C, above 250 °C → ECAM PROC APPLY QRH OEBPROC-62-00028472.0003001. ENG 1 BLEED OFF → no engine bleed is left (conclusion). Consequences:

  • Wing anti-ice lost: WAI is supplied by the pneumatic system DSC-30-20-10-00017417.0001001, and “Use of APU bleed air for wing anti-ice is not permitted” LIM-APU-20-00021771.0002001. In cloud at TAT −12 °C this is flight in icing conditions LIM-ICE_RAIN-00020608.0001001 without WAI: MIN SPEED VLS + 10 kt / GREEN DOT PRO-NOR-SUP-ADVWXR-00020722.0002001, and the landing distance needs an ice-accretion row (section 5).
  • Engine anti-ice remains on ENG 1: each engine's anti-ice is supplied by its own HP compressor bleed, independent of the pneumatic system DSC-30-30-10-00017422.0002001.
  • No pack air: PACK 2 off (ENG SHUT DOWN), PACK 1 off (BLEED FAULT). The APU may be started (ENG SHUT DOWN status note); APU bleed for air conditioning and pressurization: max 22 500 ft single pack, 15 000 ft dual pack LIM-APU-20-00021771.0002001. Using APU bleed for the packs here is not written in these procedures: open — crew decision with AFM/FCTM. If the cabin altitude exceeds the limit, CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT (red) comes on top, and OEB62 says apply it immediately.
  • Terrain: GPWS INOP (ADR 1) in the Alps area, IMC; TCAS mode TA (ENG SHUT DOWN). MSA/MORA from the chart scenario input.

Pneumatic: animated step by step on the FCOM page in the System analysis of a built report (AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT with engine 2 shut down), with its summary.

Combined STATUS — what the approach will be

FLAP LVR 3 · APPR SPD VREF + 15 KT (ADR, ALTN LAW) · GA THR: TOGA ONLY · WHEN L/G DN: DIRECT LAW · LDG DIST PROC APPLY · CAT 2 INOP (ADR) and CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY (ENG) → CAT 1, manual, no A/THR (most restrictive). Overweight: about 83.5 t at landing > MLW 79 200 kg LIM-AG-WGHT-00001893.0890001 → [QRH] OVERWEIGHT LANDING.

4 · Return decision — LSZH under LVP CODE

Arrival ATISZURICH INFORMATION M 0635Z. ILS APPROACH RWY 14. LOW VISIBILITY PROCEDURES IN FORCE. WIND 060 DEG 4 KT. VISIBILITY 500 M FREEZING FOG. RVR RWY 14 TOUCHDOWN 600 M … TEMPERATURE MINUS 3. RWY 14 RWYCC 5/5/5 FROST. constructed for training

5 · Landing performance CODE

COF's QRH in-flight method run on TC-LSB's QRH tables: FLAPS 3, 83.5 t, LSZH 1 402 ft, OAT −3 °C (below ISA: no TEMP correction), headwind 1 kt, one reverser, overweight procedure applied. Several failures (PER-A 3/16): the failure with the longest REF DIST, plus ΔLD of the others.

  • Ice accretion row (no wing anti-ice): QRH PER-D “The following ECAM alerts with Ice Accretion: DUAL BLEED FAULT …”, CONF 3, ΔVREF 22 kt. Row chosen because both engine bleeds are lost; the ECAM does not display DUAL BLEED FAULT — instructor to confirm. The same values appear in PER-C “WING ANTI ICE SYS FAULT with Ice Accretion”.
  • DUAL ADR FAULT (PER-J), CONF 3, ΔVREF 15 kt → ΔLD = REF − REF without failure.
  • ENG SHUT DOWN without ENG FIRE pb pushed has no row of its own; one reverser only.

VAPP 165 kt = VREF 142 kt (83.5 t) + ΔVREF 22 kt + APPR COR 0 kt QRH PER-A 11/16 · PER-A-00014420.0073001. MIN SPEED with ice and no WAI: VLS + 10 kt / GREEN DOT. Note: STATUS shows APPR SPD VREF + 15 KT (ADR, ALTN LAW); the QRH method takes the largest ΔVREF of the selected rows (22 kt, ice accretion) — the higher speed is the one flown (conclusion, instructor to confirm).

QRH pages used — cells marked by the calculator (runway condition selected in section 4)

FLD = LD × 1.15: QRH PER-A 1/16; OM-B 5.6.6 (15 % recommended by Airbus, applied in flight at commander discretion). LDA values are estimates from OurAirports (displaced thresholds): check against the AIP/chart.

6 · Decision MODEL wording · gates CODE

Documents

Revision of every document COF reads, taken from the document itself (transmittal letter, list of effective sections, cover page). FCOM, QRH, FCTM, AFM, MEL, OM-A, OM-B, CCM, GOM and Dispatch were checked against the SHA-256 of the index built from them: all match.

DocumentRevision / issueEffectiveWhere it is stated
FCOM A318/A319/A320/A321Issue 26 AUG 26, replacing 26 MAY 26—Transmittal Letter TRL P 1/2
QRH A319/A320/A321Issue 26 MAY 26, replacing 26 FEB 26—Transmittal Letter 1/2
FCTMNo transmittal letter in the file. List of effective sections dated 26 AUG 26—PLP-LESS P 1/2
AFMList of effective sections / documentary units dated 05 AUG 26; temporary revisions APPRO-TR 05 AUG 26—PLP-LESS P 1/8 · PLP-LEDU
MEL EK.10.74.012Revision 67; MMEL refs 09 Mar 2026 and 30 Mar 202623 Jul 2026Cover page
OM Part-A EK.10.73.001Rev.06 V.05 · revision date 21.08.202505.01.2026Cover page
OM Part-B EK.10.73.005Rev.07 V.03 · revision date 06.07.2025 · DGCA approval 03/11/202505.01.2026Cover page
CCM EK.10.71.001Rev.03 V.11 · revision date 15.10.202418.04.2025Cover page
GOM EK.10.67.001Rev.16 V.09 · revision date 06.08.202522.10.2025Cover page
Dispatch Manual EK.10.74.005Rev.07 V.01 · revision date 03.04.202621.04.2026Cover page
LVO LS.73.035Revision 09 · 19.08.202626.08.2026Document header
DGR guide LS.73.010Revision 10 · 20.02.202527.02.2025Document header
DGR allowed LS.67.051Revision 07 · 02.03.202601.04.2026Document header
De-icing HOT guidelines LS.67.046Revision 08 · revision date 21.10.2026 (tables prepared per DK.34.003 FAA Holdover Time Guidelines, Winter 2026-2027)31.10.2026Document header
EASA Easy Access Rules Air OpsRevision 24 · March 2026—Cover
SHT-OPS (SHGM)No revision field; PDF modified 31.08.2026—PDF metadata
ICAO Doc 4444 PANS-ATMSixteenth Edition, 2016 (amendment pages up to No. 12, 28/11/24 seen)10 Nov 2016Foreword / page footers
ICAO Doc 8168 Vol I · Vol IIISixth Edition 2018 · First Edition 2018—Foreword
ICAO Annex 2 · Annex 6 Part IEleventh Edition July 2024 · Twelfth Edition July 202228 Nov 2024 · 3 Nov 2022Foreword
De-Icing EK.10.67.002Revision 15 (revision record in the index; its date is on the cover, not read: PDF in Git LFS)—0.1 Ordinary Revision Records
AMLNot read: the PDF is not downloaded in this session (stored in Git LFS)——

Findings

In the product: this table is built automatically each time a PDF changes, shown in every report footer, and an alert is raised when two related documents (FCOM / QRH / FCTM) are on different issues.